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This paper estimates the impact of participating in the savings program of SEWA Bank 
in India on household income and consumption. Contrary to microcredit, microsaving has 
not received much attention in the empirical literature yet which can be explained by a lack 
of reliable household data. The paper uses panel data to account for individual unobserved 
effects that can lead to substantial biases when not being controlled for. I find that when 
controlling for self-selection, no significant impacts of the program can be observed and that 
naive estimates, which do not account for selection biases, severely overstate program 
impacts. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The potential contribution of microfinance to the alleviation of poverty has been the 
focus of intense research during the last years. What has been described as the 
“microfinance revolution” by Robinson (2001) started with microcredit schemes 
directed to economically active low-income households who previously had no access to 
formal financial services. The change from microcredit to the broader term of 
microfinance was brought about by the realisation that the poor do not only need access 
to formal credit resources, but can also profit from possibilities to save and insure 
themselves against economic shocks such as illnesses or natural disasters (Morduch, 
1999; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
 
* The author works for the evaluation department of KfW Development Bank. The views expressed in this 
paper are entirely those of the author and do no necessarily represent those of KfW. Special thanks go to 
Rainer Klump, Friedhelm Pfeiffer, Eva Terberger, Robert Lensink, Stephan Klasen, Tobias Klein, Johannes 
Tonn, the participants of the PEGNet Conference 2008 in Accra, and one anonymous referee for valuable 
comments and support.
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The availability of formal saving opportunities can have various impacts on the 
economic situation of the poor. First of all, the possibility to save money in a secure 
place while also earning interest can help low-income households to gain control over 
their income streams which can in turn lead to better consumption insurance against 
economic shocks.
1 For instance, Gertler, Levine and Moretti (2002) report findings 
from Indonesia that those households living closer to microsaving institutions are more 
likely to suffer significantly less from major illnesses. Less variability in household 
income, in turn, may not only lead to higher school enrolment rates but also to improved 
children's health (Foster (1995), Jacoby and Skoufias (1997)). Obviously, in the long run, 
this can have positive impacts on human capital formation and thus on economic growth 
as well. Secondly, microsaving can contribute positively to the future ability to 
self-finance investments, acquire assets which can then be used as collateral for future 
credit or to afford major expenditures such as schooling fees (Matin, Hulme and 
Rutherford (2002), Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), among others). This, of 
course, can lead to positive effects on household income and consumption as well. 
Without formal saving possibilities, households in developing economies usually 
rely on family or friends as money guards or buy assets as buffer stocks (Deaton (1991, 
1992)). Furthermore, informal credit contracts among families and friends are also a 
common source for smoothing income over time (Rosenzweig (1988), Udry (1994), 
among others). Another saving possibility is provided by rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) which can be found nearly universally (Bouman (1995)). In the 
simplest form of a ROSCA, every group member regularly contributes a fixed amount to 
a common pot that will then be allocated each period to one member of the group until 
everyone has received the pot.
2  On the one side, the rationale behind joining a ROSCA 
can be saving for the acquisition of durable consumption goods (Besley, Coate and 
Loury (1993)). Yet, on the other side, it can also be a strategy used by married women to 
protect household savings against claims by their husbands for immediate consumption 
(Anderson and Baland (2002)) or a self-commitment strategy for time-inconsistent 
individuals (Gugerty (2005)). Regardless of the particular reason, the microfinance 
literature agrees that low-income households can and do save and that there is 
considerable demand for formal saving opportunities (Rutherford (2001)).
3 
Unlike microcredit, microsaving has not received much attention in the empirical 
 
1 That low-income households are usually not able to insure themselves completely against income risk 
has been discussed in various contributions. See, for instance, Townsend (1994, 1995), Jalan and Ravallion 
(1999), Kochar (1999), and Gertler and Gruber (2002). 
2 The allocation mechanism is usually random, yet “bidding” ROSCAs in which members are allowed to 
bid for a certain pot as well as predefined orders of allocation are possible alternatives as well. 
3 For example, figures from Uganda reported by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) show that 
the implicit interest rate charged by a money collector can be as high as 30 percent per year just for the 
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literature yet which can be explained by a lack of reliable household data that could be 
used to assess the impact of microsaving on household characteristics. However, in the 
context of microcredit there have only been few sound impact evaluations as well. For 
example, Pitt and Khandker (1998) analyse the impact of microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh using a quasi-experimental design with an eligibility rule to instrument for 
microfinance participation while also addressing the problem of non-random program 
placement by using village-level fixed effects. They report significant impacts of 
microcredit on various household characteristics and also provide evidence on higher 
impacts when lending to women. In particular, they find that household consumption 
increases by 18 taka for every 100 taka lent to a woman, while only increasing 11 taka 
when lent to men.
4 Various other studies followed up on the seminal contribution by 
Pitt and Khandker using the same or a slight variation of the dataset. For instance, 
McKernan (2002) finds significant impacts of non-financial services such as vocational 
training on self-employment profits while Pitt and Khandker (2002) analyse the effect of 
program participation on the seasonal pattern of household consumption. They find that 
consumption smoothing through smoothing income is an important motivation for 
joining microcredit programs. 
Coleman (1999, 2002) exploits a unique characteristic of a dataset from Thailand 
which allows him to observe future participants prior to receiving their first loan in 
villages that were hitherto not served by microfinance institutions. Thus, he can employ 
a specific estimation strategy that allows him to control for self-selection and 
endogenous program placement. However, contrary to Pitt and Khandker (1998), he 
finds only very low impacts of the investigated microfinance programs. Furthermore, he 
observes that “naïve” estimates, not controlling for these potential biases, severely 
overstate program impact. Tedeschi (2008) uses the AIMS (Assessing the Impact of 
Microenterprise Services) data on Mibanco in Lima, Peru to analyse the impact of 
microcredit on microenterprise profits by using a similar approach as Coleman Coleman 
(1999, 2002) as well as by employing a fixed effects estimation strategy. She finds that 
not correcting for self-selection biases leads to an overestimation of program impact. 
Still, even when correcting for self-selection, the impact of borrowing on microenterprise 
profits seems to be significant. 
This paper attempts to partly close the gap on the impacts of microsaving by 
analysing the effects of a microsaving program established by SEWA Bank in India on 
household income and food consumption. In the case of SEWA Bank, a participation in 
 
4 Morduch (1998) criticised these results arguing that the eligibility rule was not strictly enforced so that 
the half an acre cut-off line can not be used as a valid instrument for participation which will in turn alter the 
results considerably. Pitt (1999), however, uses robustness tests to show that the results are not influenced by 
the violation of the eligibility rule. Furthermore, Khandker (2005) uses a follow-up survey in order to analyse 
the effect of microcredit over time. By using panel data models, he is able to provide results that support the 
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the savings program implies that the clients are members of SEWA Union as well. Since 
SEWA Union pursues collective bargaining for better working conditions for its 
members including negotiations for higher piece-rates and minimum wages, it can be 
presumed that there exist positive impacts of the program on household income. This, in 
turn, can lead to higher consumption expenditures as well. On the other hand, 
consumption expenditures can also be influenced by the improved ability of the 
households to manage their income streams. For the impact assessment, a dataset 
obtained from the AIMS longitudinal studies is employed, having the advantage of 
providing panel data information on microsaving clients as well as on a randomly 
selected control group. The design of the data allows for an estimation of panel data, and 
in particular fixed effects models, that can control for time-constant unobserved effects 
that have an influence on both, program participation and the respective outcomes of 
interest. Therefore, issues such as self-selection into the savings program, which could 
substantially bias the estimated results when not being controlled for, can be taken into 
account. The results of the estimation strategy are striking. When controlling for 
self-selection, no significant impacts on income or food consumption can be observed 
while naive estimates, which do not control for these biases, severely overstate program 
impacts.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, since this is the first paper that 
attempts to estimate the impacts of microsaving in a rigorous way, the results not only 
contribute to the existing evidence on the impacts of microfinance but also provide 
further valuable insight into microsaving and its potential effects. Second, this paper 
adds to the few existing impact evaluations in the context of microfinance. Due to the 
availability of panel data information, estimation techniques can be employed that are 
usually not available, yet can lead to improved estimates since selection problems can be 
better controlled for. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the survey 
design as well as the AIMS data and provides some descriptive statistics on program 
participants and the control group. Section 3 is concerned with the estimation strategy 
that will be used for the impact assessment while the estimation results are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 closes the argument. 
 
 
2.    SURVEY DESIGN AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
 
The data on SEWA Bank that is used for the impact assessment is part of the AIMS 
longitudinal studies sponsored by USAID that were also carried out for Mibanco in 
Lima, Peru and Zambuko Trust in Zimbabwe.
5 SEWA Bank is located in Ahmedabad, 
 
5 For details see Barnes, Keogh and Nemarundwe (2001), Chen and Snodgrass (2001) and Dunn and 
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India, the commercial centre of Gujarat state in Western India. The bank was founded in 
1974 emerging out of SEWA Union, a trade union consisting only of self-employed 
women working in the informal sector.
6 Since SEWA Union consists only of female 
members, SEWA Bank focuses exclusively on banking with women as well.
7 Contrary 
to Mibanco and Zambuko Trust, SEWA Bank offers its members not only possibilities 
to borrow but also to save and even emphasises savings over credit (Chen and Snodgrass 
(2001)). Therefore, for the microsaving impact assessment, the data on SEWA Bank was 
selected. 
It should be noted that saving is not compulsory at SEWA Bank. Even though clients 
have to save regularly for at least one year for being eligible to apply for an 
uncollateralised loan, it is also possible to obtain collateralised loans which have no 
restriction regarding saving behaviour. Furthermore, even in the case of uncollateralised 
loans, not the savings accounts but guarantors serve as an alternative form of security. 
Therefore, saving at SEWA Bank should not be considered as a mere by-product of the 
credit schemes. 
For each of the aforementioned studies, a baseline survey was conducted in 1997/98 
followed by a second round in 1999/2000 in which the same households were 
interviewed again. The surveys collected detailed information on household 
characteristics such as demographics, education, consumption expenditures, income or 
economic shocks as well as on the microenterprises run by the households.   
In all three studies, a stratified random sample of clients was selected from a list 
provided by the respective microfinance program. Subsequently, in India and Peru, a 
control group was identified by drawing a random sample from the nonparticipants in 
the same region who met the eligibility criteria of the microfinance institution. In 
Zimbabwe, researchers used a “random walk method” for finding an adequate control 
group.
8  The goal of the studies was to measure the impact of the microfinance programs 
on low-income households in the project cities. For this goal, mainly analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVA) were used. However, since these estimation strategies can not 
account for self-selection issues, the obtained results are likely to be biased. 
In the case of SEWA Bank, the baseline study in 1998 included information on 900 
women, 300 borrowers, 300 savers, and 300 controls.
9 The sample was chosen 
according to a three-step procedure. First, the geographical areas in which the survey 
 
6 For a detailed description of the history of SEWA Bank see Rose (1992) or Crowell (2003). 
7 Today, many microfinance institutions consider women as their predominant target group since they are 
assumed to be more reliable when it comes to repayment of loans (Hossain (1988), Hulme (1991)). 
Furthermore, some studies even report higher impacts on household outcomes such as consumption 
expenditures or children’s nutrition and schooling when lending to women (Thomas (19900, Pitt and 
Khandker (1998), Holvoet (2004), Khandker (2005)). 
8 See Barnes, Keogh and Nemarundwe (2001) for details. 
9 The description of the sample design was drawn from Chen and Snodgrass (2001). GUNHILD BERG  80 
was conducted were selected. In this step, 10 out of the 43 wards of Ahmedabad City 
were identified in which approximately half of the clients of SEWA Bank lived. Then, in 
a second step, a random selection of 300 current borrowers and savers that also reflected 
the proportional shares of clients in the ten wards was drawn from a list of all SEWA 
members provided by the bank. The randomly selected women were replaced if they 
could not be located or were unwilling to participate in the survey. In the case of savers, 
new women were also selected if they were no longer actively saving or had taken out 
loans in the meantime while borrowers were replaced if they had already repaid their 
loans. Subsequently, in a third step, the non-client sample of 300 women was chosen out 
of a list of 15,000 households with economically active women over age 18 working in 
the informal sector, the target group of SEWA Bank. 
The second round of the survey was conducted in January 2000. In total, 798 of the 
initial 900 women (89 percent) could be re-interviewed in the second period.
10 Of  those, 
12 borrowers were selected for case study research. Therefore, all in all there was 
information on 786 women, 264 borrowers, 260 savers, and 262 controls, available for 
both periods. 
Since this study focuses on the impacts of microsaving, the two groups that are left 
in the sample are first the savers group which had at least one savings account and did 
not have a loan outstanding at the time of the first interview. And second, there are the 
controls who were neither members of SEWA Bank nor SEWA Union at the time of 
Round 1 or Round 2. Furthermore, there is a small group of new savers consisting of 
those members of the control group who selected themselves into the savings program 
between the two interviews.
11  Unfortunately, there is no information on Union members 
who do not save which implies that the impact of the saving program can not be 
separated from the Union effect. The remaining sample that is used in the following 
consists of 425 women, 184 women who had savings accounts in both periods, 20 
women who became savers between 1998 and 2000 and 221 women in the control 
group.
12 
Table 1 summarises key characteristics of the three groups such as age, marital status, 
caste, number of household members and educational attainment at the time of Period 1. 
The figures show that the groups are relatively equal with respect to these parameters. 
Furthermore, the observable differences are not statistically significant. It is interesting 
 
10 Chen and Snodgrass (2001) report that drop-outs were relatively similar compared to the rest of the 
sample with respect to personal and household characteristics. 
11 There exists also a small group of three women who leave the program between the two rounds. 
However, the size is too small for obtaining reliable information on the differences compared to the other 
groups. 
12 These figures are lower than the total number of available data points due to the fact that income and 
food consumption per capita were trimmed at the top and bottom one percentile since they seemed to be 
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to note that the percentage of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/ST) is with 40 
percent relatively high in all groups. The percentage in total Ahmedabad was estimated 
to be 13 percent in 1991. However, as the formerly untouchables, SC and ST still often 
face discrimination and constitute a large part of the poorest of the poor in India 
(Borooah (2005)). Therefore, it is not surprising that they have a high representation 
among the clients of SEWA Bank. Regarding educational attainment, it can be seen that 
about 40 percent of all women have never received any kind of schooling. 
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Observations  184 20  221 
Notes: These estimates refer to the status of 425 women at the time of the ﬁrst survey. ¹ Deﬁned according to 
the household questionnaire. Primary education refers to classes 1-7 or technical training, secondary 
education to classes 8-10, and higher education to classes 11-12, college or a post-graduate program. 
Source: Socio-Economic Review Gujarat State: 2005-2006. 
 
 
Average income and food consumption per capita are summarised in Table 2. Of the 
three groups, always savers had the highest average income per capita in both periods 
and the difference compared to the control group in 1998 and 2000 is significant at the 5 
and 1 percent level, respectively. In US $, the average annual income per capita for GUNHILD BERG  82 
always savers is approximately equal to $178 in Period 1 and $182 in Period 2.
13 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that new savers experienced a strong income rise 
between the two periods which could be due to the union membership. However, the 




Table 2.    Average Income and Consumption in Rupees 
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Yearly Income per Capita (1998) 
Yearly Income per Capita (2000)¹ 
Consumption per Capita 
Daily Consumption per Capita (1998) 



















Observations  184 20  221 
Note: ¹ Reported income and consumption in 2000 were deﬂated to 1998 prices by dividing by 1.1053 and 
1.0536, respectively. 
Source: Consumer Price Index for Ahmedabad, Labour Bureau, Government of India. 
 
 
Average food consumption per capita defined as total daily food expenditures was 
relatively equal for always savers and new savers, but approximately 10 percent lower 
for the control group.
14 The difference between always savers and the control group in 
Period 1 and Period 2 is also significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Converted to US $, average daily food consumption per capita of always savers was 
approximately equal to 26.50 Cents and 26.91 Cents in 1998 and 2000, respectively. 
In order to provide further insight into income differences between savers and the 
control group, kernel densities have been estimated for 1998 and 2000.
15 Figure 1 
shows that the distribution for always savers lies more to the right than the kernel for the 
 
13 The values were calculated using the average 1998 exchange rate of $1 = Rs. 41.36 (Source: Federal 
Reserve Statistical Release (2000)). 
14 Consumption expenditures are defined as the total amount of money spent on food consumption the 
day before the interview. In order to derive these expenditures, all types of food items that were consumed 
during the previous day combined with the respective amount were collected and then multiplied by the unit 
price of the groceries. This procedure led to the total daily expense on food eaten at home and by adding the 
amount of money spent on food eaten away from home, total daily consumption expenditures were 
calculated. 
15 The kernel densities use an Epanechnikov kernel with an optimal bandwidth. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF MICROSAVING  83 
control group in both periods. While the difference in the upper part of the distributions 
does not seem to be high, the probability of low income realisations for always savers is 
considerably lower. The only observable difference in Period 2 compared to Period 1 is 
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3.  THE  ESTIMATION  STRATEGY 
 
When evaluating the impacts of a specific program, the following equation is usually 
estimated  
 
N i X D Y i i i i ,..., 1 , = + + + = ε β α γ , 
 
where  i Y  is the outcome variable of interest,  i D  is an indicator for program 
participation of household  i ,  i X   is a vector of household characteristics and  i ε  is  the 
error term. The problem arising with impact assessments is that  α   will only reflect the 
true impact of the program if program participation is completely exogenous given the 
covariates. For instance, this could be assumed if participation in the program was 
randomly assigned to the households. However, since randomisation of participation is 
rarely the case, individuals at least partly determine whether they participate in a specific 
program or not. A problem arises if this decision is not only based upon observable 
variables such as age or marital status, but on unobservables that can not be included in 
the estimation equation. In the case of microsaving, potential unobservable variables that 
influence self-selection could be, for instance, risk and time preferences, the perception 
of the future, or the ability to self-commit (Gugerty (2005)). Furthermore, in the case of 
SEWA Bank, the wish to obtain an uncollateralised loan could also be a motivation for 
participating in the savings program. If these variables are also correlated with the 
outcomes of interest conditional on the covariates, then standard estimation techniques 
such as OLS will not yield consistent estimates of program impact. 
The standard solution to the problem of self-selection is the implementation of 
instrumental variables techniques. However, suitable instruments that fulfil both 
assumptions, namely that the instrument is uncorrelated with the disturbances, but 
correlated with the treatment indicator while not having an effect on the outcome 
variable, are rarely available. One exception in the context of microfinance is the study 
by Pitt and Khandker (1998). 
A second solution lies in the estimation of panel data models. If panel data is 
available, program impacts can be consistently estimated if there exist no unobserved 
influential variables that change over time and have an effect on both, the participation 
indicator and the outcome variable of interest. It is likely that unobservables such as risk 
and time preferences or the attitude toward the future change over time, but as long as 
they are not correlated with program participation conditional on observables such as 
age, occupation or household size, which can probably be assumed, this effect can be 
captured by including these variables in the regression. Furthermore, since the intention 
to apply for an uncollateralised loan is likely to be time-constant if the loan has not been 
approved yet, this effect can be captured by using panel data models as well. Therefore, 
for the problem at hand it is most likely that panel data methods will yield better 
estimates of program impacts than OLS estimators. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF MICROSAVING  85 
The model that is estimated in the following analyses can be written as   
 
T t N i c X D Y it i t it it it ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , = = + + + + = ε γ β α , 
 
where  it Y   is the respective outcome variable which will either be household income or 
food consumption per capita.  it D   reflects the saving status of the household which will 
be equal to the number of years in the savings program.  it X  is a vector of household 
characteristics such as age and marital status of the respondent, household size, religion, 
caste, and the number of shocks experienced by the household.  t γ  is a time-specific 
intercept term and  i c  is the unobserved individual effect that is constant over time. 
Finally,  it ε   is the error term. When assuming that there exists no individual unobserved 
effect that influences  it D  as well as  it Y , standard OLS should yield consistent 
estimates of program impacts. The results from the OLS strategy will be compared to a 
fixed effects model that can eliminate the time-constant unobservables. Since this 
dataset consists of two periods, estimating a fixed effects model is equivalent to 
first-differencing. It is clear that by estimating fixed effects models, time-invariant 
variables in the  it X  such as caste and religion will be dropped from the sample. 
Compared to a random effects model, fixed effects should be more appropriate since, 
when estimating random effects,  i c  is treated as a random variable that is not allowed 
to be correlated with  it D  and  it X . Yet, it is precisely the potential correlation between 
i c  and  it D   that can lead to inconsistent estimates of program impacts. Whether a fixed 
or a random effects model is more adequate will be tested using a Hausman specification 
test. The idea behind this test is that random effects is more efficient if there exists no 
correlation between the individual-specific effects and the regressors, but it will be 
inconsistent if such a correlation exists while fixed effects would yield consistent 




4.  ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
 
The results of the OLS regression of household income and consumption per capita 
on the participation indicator and the covariates are summarised in Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
16 The Hausman test statistic is calculated as   
) ˆ ˆ ( )' ˆ ˆ ( 1
RE FE RE FE W β β β β − Σ − = − , 
where  FE β ˆ  is a vector of fixed effects estimates,  RE β ˆ  is a vector of random effects estimates and  Σ  is 
the covariance matrix of the difference vector  RE FE β β ˆ ˆ − . The test statistic follows a chi-square distribution 
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Table 3.    OLS Regression for Income per Capita 
Variable (1)  (2) 
Number of Years with Savings 
 
Household Characteristics 






Active Household Members 
 
Number of Children 
 
Number of Economic Shocks 
 





Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe 
 
Education of Respondent 
Primary Education   
 









Salaried or Contract Work 
 



















































































Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors. *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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The first column of Table 3 depicts the estimation results without the indicator for 
program participation.
17 The results suggest that marriage leads to higher household 
income per capita while household size and the number of children in the household 
have a strongly negative effect on per capita household income. Besides of the natural 
effect that a higher number of non-earning children in the household will lead to lower 
income per capita, it is likely that more children in the household will also imply that 
earning household members have to stay at home, thus resulting in lower income per 
capita as well. In this respect, it is straightforward that a higher number of economically 
active household members will lead to higher household income per capita.   
It is interesting that the number of negative shocks experienced by a household 
seems to have no measurable effect on income per capita. However, the reason for this 
finding might be that there is only information available on the number of economic 
shocks experienced by a household, but not on the monetary equivalent. Thus, it is likely 
that the shocks differ considerably with respect to their actual severity and a mere 
comparison of the number of shocks might not be able to reflect the true impact on 
household income.   
It is surprising to note that the effects of religion and caste are insignificant. The 
omitted categories are ‘muslim/christian’ and ‘upper caste’ which implies that household 
income per capita does not vary significantly between, for example, upper caste 
households, backward castes, and SC/ST. The effect of the respondents’ education is 
positive and significant suggesting that education leads to considerable increases in 
household income per capita confirming the human capital literature (Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001), among others). Furthermore, ‘higher education’ seems to have the 
strongest effect (the omitted category is ‘no education’). Finally, compared to ‘own 
account work’ as the principal activity of the household, piece-rate work and casual 
labour lead to significantly less income per capita while salaried and contract work 
imply higher household income. 
In the second column of Table 3, the participation indicator - equal to the number of 
years with savings - is added as an additional regressor.
18 The results suggest that 
program participation has a highly significant and positive impact on income per capita. 
They indicate that one more year with SEWA savings leads to an increase in yearly 
household income per capita of Rs. 141.26 which is approximately equal to 2 percent of 
average income per capita. The sign and significance of the other variables remain 
relatively unchanged when including the savings indicator. However, the size of the 
effects changes for most of the variables, especially for caste and the principal activity of 
the household, suggesting that participation in the savings program is correlated with 
these variables. 
 
17 The results of a regression of monthly income per capita on the covariates are comparable to the results 
in Table 3 with respect to the significance of the coefficients and were therefore not reported in detail. 
18 All results remain exactly the same when using a dummy variable for saving status instead. GUNHILD BERG  88 
Table 4.    OLS Regression for Consumption per Capita 
Variable (1)  (2) 
Number of Years with Savings 
 
Household Characteristics 
Age of Respondent 
 






Active Household Members 
 
Number of Children 
 
Number of Economic Shocks 
 
Income per Capita 
 
(Income per Capita)² 
 





Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe 
 
Education of Respondent 
Primary Education   
 









Salaried or Contract Work 
 































































































Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors. *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of the OLS regression of food consumption per capita 
on the covariates. In the first column, it can be seen that the age of the respondent has a 
significant and also non-linear effect on food consumption per capita. Furthermore, 
marriage and the size of the household seem to have a significantly negative impact and 
even though the number of economically active household members and the number of 
children in the household are insignificant, the sign of the coefficient is the same as for 
the regression on household income. Similar to the finding above, the number of 
negative economic shocks experienced by a household has only a negligible impact on 
food consumption per capita. That the education of the respondent and the principal 
activity of the household do not seem to have a significant influence on food 
consumption per capita is likely to be due to the fact that their impact is already captured 
in the income variable through which they affect consumption expenditures as well. 
Furthermore, even though caste does not seem to have a measurable effect, food 
consumption per capita is significantly lower for Hindus compared to Muslims and 
Christians. 
The effect of yearly income per capita on food consumption expenditures per day is 
highly significant and also non-linear suggesting that the positive impact decreases with 
rising household income. The marginal propensity to consume (mpc) calculated at mean 
income per capita is equal to 0.1415. The mpc’s have also been calculated for the 10th 
and 90th percentiles in order to provide further insight into consumption patterns of the 
different income groups. The mpc for the 10th percentile is with 0.1984 considerably 
higher than mpc of 0.0152 for the 90th percentile. Since consumption is defined as food 
expenditures only, this implies that the poorest households spend approximately 20 
percent of their income on food consumption whereas the better off have consumption 
expenditures of around 2 percent of household income. The elasticity of food 
consumption with respect to income calculated at the mean values of income and 
consumption suggests that food consumption expenditures per capita increase by 
approximately 0.26 percent for a 1 percent increase in income per capita. 
In column two, the program participation indicator is added to the regression. It can 
be seen that the effect of the savings program again seems to be significant even though 
controlling for income per capita. The results suggest that one additional year with 
SEWA savings leads to an increase in daily food consumption of Rs. 0.08 which is 
approximately equal to 1 percent of average daily food consumption. Similar to the 
finding above, the sign and significance of the other covariates seems to be relatively 
unchanged, but the size of the coefficients is again affected.   
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a savings account at SEWA Bank on household income and food consumption per capita. 
However, in order to correct for potential self-selection into the savings program, a fixed 
effects model has been employed as summarised in Table 5. It can be seen that program 
participation has now an insignificant effect on income as well as on food consumption 
per capita and that the impact of having a savings account is considerably lower than 
suggested by the OLS model. Furthermore, the household fixed effects are jointly 
significant at the 1 percent level in both cases, indicating that self-selection into the 
savings program has to be taken into account in order to reliably estimate program 
impact. When considering the covariates, the results indicate that only household size, 
the number of active household members and the dummy for salaried or contract work 
remain significant in the regression on income per capita. The main reason for this 
finding is a lack of sufficient variation in most of the other variables between the two 
periods. In the regression on food consumption per capita, the significance of the 
variables remains relatively unchanged compared to the OLS results. 
 
 
Table 5.  Fixed  Effects  Results 
Variable  Income per Capita  Consumption per Capita 







Active Household Members 
 
Number of Children 
 
Number of Economic Shocks 
 
Income per Capita 
 
(Income per Capita)² 
 





Salaried or Contract Work 
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Observations 





Notes: *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
In order to judge the results of the fixed effects estimations against a random effects 
model, a Hausman test has been used. The results of the random effects estimations are 
very similar to the OLS results. However, the effect of the savings program on food 
consumption per capita is not significant similar to the fixed effects results.
19 The 
chi-square test statistic is equal to 17.91 for the regression on income per capita and 
41.74 for the regression on food consumption per capita. Thus, the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the error term and the regressors can be rejected at the 10 and 1 
percent level, respectively.
20 Therefore, it can be concluded that fixed effects seems to 
be the appropriate model for estimating the impact of SEWA Bank on household income 
and food consumption per capita. 
The two main findings of the analyses are that first, an estimation of a standard OLS 
model overestimates the impact of having a savings account at SEWA Bank on income 
and food consumption per capita. And second, when taking into account self-selection 
into the savings program, the impact of the program becomes insignificant in both cases. 
This suggests that those participating in the savings program differ considerably from 
the control group with respect to some unobserved characteristics that also cause them to 
have higher than average income and consumption patterns. Furthermore, the 
observation that the impact of the program becomes insignificant once controlling for 
self-selection might indicate that the difference in income and food consumption 
between savers and the control group is solely due to self-selection which would imply 
that the effect of the program is close to zero. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
By providing formal financial services to low-income households, microfinance is 
assumed to have the potential for a long-lasting and sustainable effect on poverty 
alleviation. In this respect, not only microcredit but also microsaving plays a crucial role 
since low-income households demand a broad range of financial services in order to be 
able to afford major acquisitions, smooth consumption over time and self-insure against 
income shocks.   
However, few microfinance programs have received rigorous statistical impact 
 
19 For details see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
20 The p-values are equal to 0.0565 and 0.0000, respectively. GUNHILD BERG  92 
analyses which is true even more in the context of microsaving than for microcredit. The 
reason is mainly that impact evaluations require reliable but rarely available information 
on program participants as well as on a control group. Nevertheless, since issues such as 
self-selection can severely bias estimated results, naive estimates, not taking into 
account these potential biases, might not reflect the true impacts of the program. 
The estimated results on the impacts of microsaving provided new insights into an 
important aspect of microfinance that receives increasing attention in the literature. Due 
to the availability of panel data, estimation techniques such as fixed effects could be 
employed that can reduce potential biases since selection problems can be better 
controlled for. The results of the estimation strategy were striking. When controlling for 
self-selection, no significant impacts of the program on income or food consumption 
could be observed. Furthermore, it was shown that naive estimates, not controlling for 
these biases, severely overstate program impacts. 
However, the results do not necessarily imply that there exists no impact of SEWA 
Bank at all. It is possible that spill-over effects due to the collective bargaining of 
SEWA Union have an influence on other women in the respective trade groups as well 
so that not only SEWA members but also women in the control group are affected by the 
program. This presumption remains to be tested with a dataset that allows for a more 
detailed differentiation between the various groups.   
Furthermore, the results should not be interpreted in a way that microsaving is 
ineffective. First of all, the effects of a specific program will always depend on the 
respective context and the design of the program. Second, even though the impacts on 
income and food consumption per capita seem to be insignificant, long-term effects, for 
instance on education or a better ability to smooth consumption over time, can not be 
assessed with the data at hand. However, for analyzing those questions, long-run panel 
data with multiple observations over the course of the year would be needed. And third, 
even if it is indeed the case that only those are supported who have an aptitude toward 
saving, proving a formal savings product to them is still likely to be considerably more 
efficient compared to the alternative of an informal savings scheme.     
Microfinance has a high potential for contributing to the alleviation of poverty, but it 
should be kept in mind that it can be no panacea. The impacts of a specific program are 
highly dependent on the characteristics of the program itself and the respective 
country-context. Furthermore, positive impacts should not be taken for granted. In future 
research, improved longitudinal data and estimation techniques are needed in order to be 
able to reliably judge the effects against the impacts of other programs that aim at 
reducing poverty. Furthermore, in order to discern what really drives the self-selection 
of households into savings programs, information on the potentially influential 
unobservable variables such as risk and time preferences would be needed. By including 
this information in household surveys, more light could be shed on whether these 
variables indeed influence self-selection. Obtaining such information would thus not 
only be helpful for understanding saving preferences of low-income households in 
developing economies but also for designing microsaving programs.     EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF MICROSAVING  93 
Appendix 
Table A1.    Random Effects Results 
Variable  Income per Capita  Consumption per Capita 
Number of Years with Savings 
 
Household Characteristics 
Age of Respondent 
 






Active Household Members 
 
Number of Children 
 
Number of Economic Shocks 
 
Income per Capita 
 
(Income per Capita)² 
 





Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe 
 
Education of Respondent 
Primary Education   
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Observations  850 850 
Notes: *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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